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How does ideological polarization on non-economic matters influence the size of 
government? We analyze this question using a differentiated candidates framework: Two 
office-motivated candidates differ in their (fixed) ideological position and their production 
function for public goods, and choose which tax rate to propose. We provide conditions under 
which a unique equilibrium exists. In equilibrium, candidates propose different tax rates, and 
the extent of economic differentiation is influenced by the distribution and intensity of non-
economic preferences in the electorate. In turn, the extent of economic differentiation 
influences whether parties divide the electorate primarily along economic or social lines. 
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June 16, 2011 1 Introduction
It is well known that the two major political parties in the U.S. dier signiﬁcantly in their positions
on both social issues as well as economic issues. As a consequence, both economic preferences
as well as “ideology”, which we take to mean preferences on cultural issues, inﬂuence voting
behavior.
For example, Table 1 displays information from California voter exit polls in the 2008 elec-
tions.1 Rows correspond to information on how a voter voted on Proposition 8, a ballot measure
that would outlaw gay marriage (so yes-votes are by “social conservatives”). Columns correspond
to a voter’s household income in the 2007. Entries in the cells are Obama’s share of the two party
vote for President (i.e., votes for Obama
votes for Obama or McCain  100%).
income < $50000  $ 50000
YES on Prop. 8 41% 36%
NO on Prop. 8 90% 86%
Table 1: Cultural and economic determinants of voting behavior
The attitude toward gay marriage is a useful proxy for preferences on social policy only, as
the economic eect of Proposition 8 is very limited. Household income is a plausible proxy for
preferences on economic policy and the scope of government. Table 1 indicates very clearly that
both economic and ideological factors inﬂuence a person’s vote for an oce such as the presidency
that combines a role in economic policy with a strong inﬂuence on social issues (for example, via
judicial appointments). Social conservatives (i.e., yes-votes on Proposition 8) are substantially less
likely to vote for Obama than social liberals (by about 50 percentage points), and poorer voters are
more likely to vote for Obama than richer ones (by about 5 percentage points).2
1Data from National Election Pool state exit poll for California, available from the Roper Center
(http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/common/state exitpolls.html)
2Of course, neither category can be expected to be a perfect measure of preferences in the respective policy area:
There are several other social policy questions such as abortion or gun rights on which the two parties dier substan-
tially and which may inﬂuence a voter’s ideological preference for one of the parties’ social policy positions. Similarly,
a voter’s economic interests in an election are not only determined by household income in any given year in the past,
but also by his expectations about future income, household size and composition (as this inﬂuences both how much
taxes a voter has to pay and, presumably, his consumption of public goods) and age.
1This voter behavior is plausible if parties/candidates dier in both the economic and the social-
cultural policies that they would implement if elected. If parties are completely identical (both on
economic and social issues), then voter behavior should be random. If parties diered only in one
policy area, (e.g., the social position as is the case in the probabilistic voting model, where both
candidates choose identical economic platforms) voter choices should only be determined by their
preferences on that area, but independent of their preferences on the other policy. Note that, if
social and economic preferences are correlated (e.g., wealthier voters are more likely to be socially
conservative) then voting behavior is correlated although there is no causal relation. However,
once we condition on both income and social preference, as we do in Table 1, then the remaining
dierences must be based on causation rather than correlation.3
The extent of the policy dierence between parties in each policy area will inﬂuence how
strongly dierent preferences on a dimension translate into dierent voting behavior. For example,
in “What’s the matter with Kansas”, Frank (2004) argues that Democrats’ economic policy has
become very similar to Republican economic policy, causing many voters who would be “natural”
Democratic partisans instead follow their culturally conservative leanings and vote Republican.
Similarly, the exit poll data in Table 1 appear to indicate that cultural determinants of voting be-
havior have a quantitatively stronger eect than economic ones.
From an economic point of view, this raises an important question: How does ideological po-
larization on social issues aect economic policy? While both economic and ideological factors
interact in determining a voter’s choice between candidates, the standard models in political econ-
omy are ill-equipped to analyze these questions. If the simple one-dimensional policy model is
interpreted as one of economic policy, there is, by deﬁnition, no ideological dimension, and voters
split according to their economic preferences even if there is only slight dierentiation between
the economic platforms proposed by the candidates.
The probabilistic voting model accommodates both an “economic” dimension on which can-
didates choose a policy and an “ideological” dimension which is an additive shock to the utility
of voters and can be thought of as arising from cultural issues on which the candidates’ positions
dier. However, in the equilibrium of the standard probabilistic voting model, both candidates al-
ways propose the same economic policy, and thus the voters’ preference for one of the candidates
3In fact income and the position on Proposition 8 are correlated: 44.7% of voters with income less than $50,000
votedinfavorofProposition8, whilethepercentageincreasedto56.2%amongthosewithincomesexceeding$50,000,
indicating that wealthier voters are more socially conservative. However, the numbers given in table 1 are conditioned
on both income and social preferences, and are therefore unaected by any correlation between the two.
2is only determined by their ideological position and not by their economic characteristics. The data
reported in Table 1 suggest that this prediction is not entirely correct, and clearly, the reason is that
real life Democratic and Republican candidates dier not only in ideological positions, but also in
economic policy platforms.
The main question of this paper is how ideological polarization aects the economic platforms
of the parties. We approach this issue in a framework where candidates have both ﬁxed and ﬂexible
positions. We think of the ﬁxed position as reﬂecting ideological dierences that the candidates do
not want to or cannot credibly compromise on, just like in the citizen-candidate model. However,
just like in the Downsian model, candidates in our model are oce motivated, and choose position
on economic policy to maximize their winning probability.
The advantage of our framework is twofold. First, since both candidates’ immutable positions
on social issues and their equilibrium platforms on economic issues dier, voters choose their pre-
ferred candidate based on both economic and ideological issues: Social conservatives who happen
to be suciently keen on government spending may vote for the Democrat, and social liberals
who are suciently opposed to high taxation may vote for the Republican. Second, candidates
compete for voter support by choosing economic platforms, taking as given their ideological dif-
ferences and the preference distribution in the population. Within our framework we can think of
polarization as a measure of preference intensity on the ideological component. We analyze how
increasing ideological polarization translates into changes of economic policy. In addition, we can
consider the eects of shifts in the ideological composition of the electorate (say, an increase in the
number of social conservatives), as well as changes in the economic preference distribution (either
allowing for an on average higher demand for public goods, or for more polarization of economic
preferences).
Our main results are as follows. We ﬁrst show that an equilibrium is characterized by two cuto
voter types, one for each ideological type. Cuto voters are indierent between candidates and
therefore must strictly prefer the economic platform of the candidate whose ideological position
they dislike. Thus, the socially liberal cuto voter is in favor of less government spending than the
socially conservative cuto voter. (Note that this is only true for the cuto voter. It may well be
the case that, on average, social conservatives prefer lower tax rates than social liberals.)
What matters for the candidates’ position choice are these potentially swingable cuto voters.
In equilibrium, candidates propose tax rates that are intermediate between the rate preferred by the
social liberal cuto voter and the one preferred by the social conservative cuto voter. A candidate
3who marginally increases his proposed tax rate gains votes among social conservatives, but loses
some liberals, and those gains and losses exactly balance in equilibrium for each candidate. Note
that the statement that more government spending increases the set of conservatives who vote for
the candidate does not imply that higher tax rates are on average popular with social conservatives
as a group. Clearly, at least some social conservatives (and quite possibly a majority of them)
dislike higher taxes, but those are not the swing voters that the candidates focus on.
Taking the opponent’s tax rate as given, varying a candidate’s tax rate generates a curve of
cuto voter pairs in a two-dimensional space, and a candidate chooses the best cuto voter pair
from this curve. We show that, in equilibrium, the two candidates’ curves are tangent to each other
at the equilibrium-induced cuto voter pair. They are also tangent to an isoprobability curve, i.e.
a curve that connects all those cuto voter combinations that lead to the same winning probability
for the Democrat.
We provide sucient conditions for an equilibrium to exist and to be unique. The graphical
characterization of the equilibrium described above can be used to study the comparative statics
properties of the equilibrium, because it is relatively easy to characterize how parameter changes
aect isoprobability curves.
We show that any parameter change induces the candidates to change their respective platforms
in the same direction. That is, changes in cultural polarization (either in the number of liberals or
conservatives, or in the intensity with which they care about non-economic issues) either lead to
an increase of both the Democratic and the Republican tax rate, or to a decrease of both of them.
This appears consistent with the observed recent movement of both parties’ economic platforms to
the right.4
If there are more socially conservative voters, or if socially conservative voters’ emphasis on
cultural issues increases, then both candidates propose more government spending, but the small-
government candidate’s winning probability increases. The opposite conclusions hold when there
are more socially-liberal voters, or if they care more about cultural issues.
Finally, we also provide a comparative static analysis of an increase in economic polarization.
Interestingly, the results here depend on the ideological composition of the electorate. If there are
more social conservatives than social liberals (which appears to be the case relevant for the United
4For example, the health care plan of the Republican party in the 1990s involved subsidies for low income house-
holdsandanindividualmandatetobuyhealthinsurance. Asimilarplanwaseventuallypassedin2010byaDemocratic
Congress, and against strong Republican opposition.
4States), then an increase in income inequality leads to less government spending. We do not
explicitly model feedback eects in a dynamic setting, but this is clearly a possibility here: More
inequality leads to less government spending, and less government spending in certain areas such
as education may itself lead to a more unequal income distribution, further depressing government
spending, and so on. In contrast, if there are more social liberals than social conservatives, then an
increasein initialinequality leadsto moregovernmentspending, potentiallydiminishing inequality
in the future. Thus, in our model, the distribution of cultural ideology in the electorate may have
an important eect on how a society reacts to initial economic shocks, and whether such a reaction
reinforces or mitigates the initial shock.
2 Related literature
Our model is based on the general dierentiated candidates framework developed in Krasa and
Polborn (2009a, 2010b, 2010a), in which the two competing candidates have some characteristics
that cannot be changed, but choose a position (or “policy”) in order to maximize their respective
probabilityofwinning. Voters’utilitydependsonbothﬁxedcharacteristicsandﬂexiblepolicies. In
this model, candidates are dierentiated with respect to ideology and their ability to provide public
goods, with one of the candidates having an advantage in providing a large quantity of public
goods, while his opponent has an advantage in providing a lean government. Both candidates
choose a tax rate in order to maximize their respective winning probability.
The advantage of the dierentiated candidates framework relative to a standard probabilistic
voting model (PVM) is that there is complete policy convergence in the PVM (i.e., in any equilib-
rium, both candidates choose the same economic policy), and thus, voting behavior is determined
only by the voters’ position on the “ideological” dimension in which candidates are exogenously
ﬁxed. Any observed inﬂuence of economic factors on voting behavior would have to stem from
ideologically ﬁxed positions that inﬂuence the utilities of rich and poor voters dierentially.
The advantage of our model relative to a citizen-candidate model (in which candidates are ﬁxed
to their “ideal position” in every policy area) is that there is a unique equilibrium in our model, and
that we can relate changes in ideological polarization of the electorate to changes in the economic
policies proposed by the candidates.5
5The citizen-candidate framework can handle multidimensional policy spaces without fundamental diculties (Os-
borne and Slivinski 1996, Besley and Coate 1997). However, there are generally very many equilibria that only share
5In a standard one-dimensional spatial model, equilibrium policy depends only on the ideal pol-
icy position of the median voter, but is independent of the higher-order moments of the distribution
of voter preferences.6 Lindqvist and ¨ Ostling (2010) ﬁnd empirical evidence that a larger degree of
preference polarization is associated with a smaller size of government, but the theoretical basis
for this eect remains a bit unclear.
There are a number of papers that use dierent variations on the spatial model to analyze how
increasing diversity of voter preferences aects the size of government. Austen-Smith and Waller-
stein (2006) analyze how, in a legislative bargaining model, general redistribution is aected by the
existence of racial preferences. Lizzeri and Persico (2001, 2004) analyze the incentives of politi-
cians for redistribution under dierent electoral systems and show that expanding the set of citizens
who are eligible to vote may induce candidates to change their equilibrium platforms from patron-
age policies towards policies that have more general beneﬁts. Somewhat relatedly, Fern´ andez and
Levy (2008) develop a model in which all poor voters prefer general redistributive taxation, but
have conﬂicting interests regarding a number of local public goods that are beneﬁcial only for a
subset of them. They show that this setup leads to a non-monotonic relationship between prefer-
ence fragmentation and redistribution. Preference diversity in all of these models is “economic”,
i.e., politicians have dierent types of economic policies (such as general and targeted redistri-
bution) at their disposal, voters are interested in both general interest and (some) special interest
policies, and they only care about their total economic beneﬁt from the bundle of policies that are
enacted by the election winner. In contrast, our model has a simpler economic policy (as it con-
tains only the choice of one parameter, the tax rate), but it analyzes how this choice is aected by
preference diversity in non-economic dimensions, which are non-existent in these models.
Roemer (1998) analyzes a model in which, like in our model, voters care about economic
policy and about government policy along a non-economic dimension. Parties are considerably
more complex in Roemer’s model: They consist of some members who want to maximize the
probability of winning the election and some who want to maximize the expected (policy) utility
of particular party members. Since party positions on both dimensions are ﬂexible, it is necessary
to introduce this modeling of parties in order to ensure the existence of an equilibrium. Under
the property that both candidates always receive the same number of votes. Just like in the one-dimensional setup,
the citizen candidate model imposes few restrictions on which policies can arise in equilibrium. Thus, no useful
comparative static analysis with respect to social polarization is possible in that framework.
6In Meltzer and Richard (1981), a classical political-economy model of redistribution, the income distribution in
society matters, but only to the extent that it inﬂuences the median voter’s preferences for redistribution.
6certain conditions, Roemer ﬁnds that a higher weight on non-economic policy in the voters’ utility
function decreases the optimal tax rate for the party that prefers more redistribution.
The topic of economic and social polarization has also attracted considerable interest in po-
litical science. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) show that there is considerable correlation
between the development of economic inequality in the U.S. as measured by the Gini coecient
and a measure of polarization between Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. Congress. They ar-
gue that the relationship is causal: Increased economic inequality has caused the parties to choose
more polarized economic platforms. However, they do not present a formal model that generates
this prediction. Also the empirical conclusion that polarization is primarily along economic is-
sues is not uncontested (see Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002), Lee and Roemer (2006)).
Our model takes non-economic policy dierences between parties as given, and analyzes how
economic platforms are aected by them.
3 Model
3.1 Description of the model
Two candidates, j = D;R, compete in an election. There are two major components of policy,
which Stokes (1963) calls “position issues” and “valence issues”. Position issues are ideological
issues such as abortion or gun control, and candidates are exogenously committed to dierentiated
positions; due to their own history or their party label, they cannot credibly change this position.
Voters have dierent ideal positions on the position issue. In contrast, the valence issue is related
to the management of public good provision by the oce holder, and all voters prefer ceteris
paribus (i.e., if costs of implementing the policy are not taken into account) a higher provision
level. Candidates propose a tax rate and will then use the tax revenue to provide a public good.
Candidates dier in their production function, so that, in addition to the tax rate, the identity of the
oce holder also matters for the quantity of public goods produced.
The modeling of the valence issue follows Krasa and Polborn (2009b). Candidate j proposes
a tax rate tj, which is applied to the average income of the population, ¯ m, normalized to 1. Thus,
tax revenue if candidate j is elected is tj and is used to pay for government ﬁxed cost and for the
provision of a public good g. The ability to provide the public good diers among candidates, and
is given by an ane linear production function, gj = fj(tj) = ajtj   bj. We analyze situations in
7which candidate R has an advantage with respect to ﬁxed cost b, while his opponent D has a higher
marginal product in public good provision. Formally,
Assumption 1. Let aR < aD and bR < bD.
The candidates’ positions on the ideological position issue are ﬁxed. Because there are only
two candidates, we can, without loss of generality, assume that q 2 fL;Cg, where q = L (“liberal”)
for the Democrat and q = C (“conservative”) for the Republican.
Individual voters’ preferences depend on public good consumption g, their private good con-
sumption x (determined by the tax rate), and the ideological position of the elected candidate. For-
mally, the utility function of a voter of type  = (;m; p) 2 T is u(x;g;q) = x + w(g) + v(p;q),
where x is the voter’s private consumption; g is public consumption; w is increasing, strictly con-
cave and dierentiable, and satisﬁes limx!0 w0(x) = 1 and limx!1 w0(x) = 0 — dierent pref-
erences over public good consumption are reﬂected in the parameter  2 R, with high  types
having a stronger preference for public goods. Finally, v(p;q)m is a measure of the ideological
(dis)utility. We assume that
v(p;q) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
m if p = L; q = D
m if p = C; q = R
0 otherwise
(1)
The parameter  in (1) captures the ideological beneﬁt, expressed as a percentage of income, that
liberals get if the Democrat (rather than the Republican) is elected, and  is the same for conserva-
tives if the Republican candidate is elected.7 Note that the assumption that v(L;R) = v(C;D) = 0
is without loss of generality because for each voter type p = L;C we have one free normalization.8
7Multiplying  and  by m has the eect that the “willingness to pay” for the ideologically preferred candidate is
linear in income. If, instead, this willingness to pay was constant in income, then economic concerns would trump
social issues for all suciently wealthy individuals, and only suciently poor individuals vote based on ideology. The
reverse would be true, i.e., wealthy citizens would only vote based on ideology if  and  are multiplied with a function
of m that increases at a faster than linear rate. Our assumption provides a middle ground between these two cases and
simpliﬁes the analysis — the analysis can be extended to more general cases at the cost of the two-dimensional
geometric presentation provided below.
8Equation (1) can be derived from a spatial representation v(p;q) =  jp   qjm (i.e., a voter’s utility decreases
linearly with the distance between the voter’s ideal position p and the candidate’s position q, and the equivalent
variation for having one’s ideologically favorite candidate elected is a constant fraction of the voter’s income) by
8At the time when candidates choose their platforms, they are uncertain about the distribution
of types . Speciﬁcally, there is a state of the world ! 2 
, distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function . Given !, type  2 T is distributed according to !. Let S j be the set of all











> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
0 if x < 0:5;
0:5 if x = 0:5;
1 if x > 0:5:
The timing of events is as follows:
Stage 1 Candidates j = D;R simultaneously announce tax rates tj 2 [0;1]. Candidates are oce-
motivated (they receive utility 1 if elected, and utility 0 otherwise, independent of the imple-
mented policy), so that their objective is to maximize their respective winning probabilities
D and R.
Stage 2 Nature draws !, which determines the distribution of voter preferences  in the electorate.
Each citizen votes for his preferred candidate, or abstains when indierent.9 The candidate
with a majority of votes wins, collects taxes and provides the public good.
3.2 Discussion of modeling choices
Dierential candidate capabilities. A key assumption of the dierentiated candidates model
is that candidates have dierential abilities, with one candidate better at providing limited gov-
ernment, while the other candidate is better than his competitor for large expenditures. While
non-standard, this assumption appears eminently reasonable. Economists agree that workers or
ﬁrms dier in their productivities, and this fact is evident as output can easily be measured in many
normalizing accordingly. Note that  ,  corresponds to cases where the distance between the Republican candidate’s
ideological position and the ideal position of conservatives is dierent from the distance between the Democrat’s
ideological position and the ideal position of liberals.
9If a voter has a strict preference, then it is a weakly dominant strategy to vote for the preferred candidate. If a
voter is indierent, he could in principle vote for any candidate or abstain, and we assume that he abstains.
9private sector occupations. In contrast, the “output” of politicians in terms of public good produc-
tion is signiﬁcantly more dicult to measure, and thus it is tempting to use expenditures on inputs
as a proxy measure for the quantity of the public good supplied. However, in reality, citizens derive
utility, for example, from the quality of education in state schools and not per se from the money
spent on education. Thus, when two competing candidates propose to spend the same amount of
money on schools, this does not mean that both of them would produce the same quality of service
for citizens if elected. Our model formalizes this notion.
There are several dierent interpretations of the candidates’ dierentiated production possi-
bilities. First, there is a widespread notion that Republicans have an advantage when it comes
to running a small government. For example, Egan (2008) demonstrates that Republicans have a
long-run public opinion advantage over Democrats on the issue of “taxes”, while simultaneously
a majority of people say that they trust Democrats more than Republicans on large expenditure
issues such as education and health care. Of course, revenues and expenditures are two sides of the
same coin. Our preferred interpretation of these opinion polls is therefore that (many) people think
that the advantage of a Republican government is that it is better in taking care of taxpayer dollars
by trimming government spending to a minimum, a task in which Democrats may be hampered,
for example by their connections to unions of government workers. On the other hand, Democrats
are preferable for delivering a high level of public good service.
A dierence between political parties can also arise as a consequence of specialization on
dierent policy areas: Republicans may be specialized in the ecient provision of services such
as law enforcement that are “basic” in the sense that every government – whether Democratic or
Republican – has to provide them, while the Democrats’ eciency advantage lies in the provision
of “optional” services (i.e., services that could, but need not be provided by the government) such
as, for example, government provision of health care.
Alternatively, suppose that learning-by-doing increases the incumbent’s marginal productivity
over his challenger’s one. However, incumbency also leads to entrenchment, so if the next oce
holder were charged with reducing bureaucracy and government spending, it may well be the case
that the challenger is better able to achieve this objective.
Ideology. Economists tend to focus on economic issues as the central ﬁeld of conﬂict in political
competition. Speciﬁcally, in most political economy models, candidates choose a policy that is
interpreted as a tax rate, and voters split over candidates according to their economic preferences.
10In our opinion, this view is only half-right.
We agree that economic issues are the main ﬂexible position for candidates: While it may be
very dicult for a candidate to credibly change a position on a position issue such as abortion,
the death penalty or gun control, there are no comparable constraints that prevent a politician who
favored a 5 percent sales tax in a previous campaign to credibly advocate a 6 percent or a 4 percent
rate in the current campaign. A reason for this dierence is also that the optimal economic policy
(for any preference type) depends on the state of the economy and thus naturally changes over
time, while one’s view of the desirability of gay marriage or abortion restrictions is more likely to
be fairly constant over time.
The economic policy platforms of Republican and Democratic candidates usually dier in a
non-trivial way, but, while economic positions clearly inﬂuence the voting choice of some voters,
economic interests are far from being a perfect predictor of voting behavior. For example, ac-
cording to the exit polls of the 2008 U.S. presidential election,10 voters making less than $100000
went 55-43 for Obama over McCain, while they split voters making more than $100000 49-49.
This is a signiﬁcant, but not overwhelmingly large dierence. Non-economic social issues play a
role for voting choices that is at least as important, and probably more important than economic
interests. Whether a voter regularly goes to church (a proxy for attitudes towards social issues) is
a strong predictor of voting intentions. For example, according to the exit polls of the 2008 U.S.
presidential election, voters who attended church weekly went for McCain 55-43, while occasional
church-goers went for Obama 57-42, and those who never go to church went for Obama 67-30.
These results indicate that we need a theory of candidate competition and voting that accom-
modates the strong role of non-economic issues on voting behavior, and helps us understand how
ideological issues inﬂuence the positions that candidates take on economic issues.
Uncertainty about the voter preference distribution. Including uncertainty about the voter
distribution has two objectives. First, it appears quite realistic to assume that the preference dis-
tribution in the electorate is not precisely known and that candidates have to make their choices
under some uncertainty. Second, the assumption helps us to reﬁne the set of equilibria. If the
distribution of voters is known with certainty and candidate payos depend only on whether they
win (rather than vote share), then, generically, there are many equilibria. The reason is that one
candidate usually wins for sure, and thus, the policy choice of his opponent is indeterminate. Also,
10Available at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#USP00p1.
11the better candidate can win with a whole set of policies. Therefore, many strategies could be part
of an equilibrium. Assuming uncertainty about the voter preference distribution eliminates most
of these equilibria.
Ricardian equivalence. In our model, all government expenditures have to be ﬁnanced by con-
temporaneously raised taxes, and we therefore use “higher taxes” and “more government spend-
ing” as synonymous. When the government can run a deﬁcit, taxes and spending need not be the
same in any given year, but Ricardian equivalence suggests that current government spending is
the appropriate measure for the taxes that have to be raised either today or in the future to ﬁnance
today’s government spending. We would therefore interpret periods in which government spending
increased as a percentage of GDP (such as Reagan’s or George W. Bush’s presidency) as periods
of “higher taxes”, even if nominal tax rates remained constant or even declined, while the shortfall
was made up by a deﬁcit.
4 Equilibrium
Substituting candidate j’s proposed tax rate tj into the utility function of a type  voter, we get
indirect utility u((1   tj)m;gj;qj) = (1   tj)m + w(gj) + v(p;qj). Dividing by m, we have
u((1   tj)m;gj;qj)
m
= (1   tj) + w(gj) +
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
 if p = L; q = D
 if p = C; q = R
0 otherwise
(2)
where  = =m. With utility written in this form, the relevant type space is fL;Cg. Distribution
! deﬁnes a cumulative distribution function G!(L;C).
We now show that a candidate’s supporters consist of -types below or above a cuto, where
the location of the cuto depends on the ideological type. Formally, the sets of a candidate’s
supporters are of the form fLg  ( 1;L] [ fCg  ( 1;C], or fLg  [L;1] [ fCg  [C;1). In the
following, denote the amount of public goods provided by the two candidates by gD = fD(tD) and
gR = fR(tR), respectively. Furthermore, let v(p;q)  v(p;q)=m denote the last term in (2). A voter
of type (; p) prefers candidate D over candidate R if and only if
(1   tD) + w(gD) + v(p;D)  (1   tR) + w(gR) + v(p;R): (3)
12(3) is equivalent to
 
tD   tR + v(p;R)   v(p;D)
w(gD)   w(gR)
; (4)
if w(gD)   w(gR) > 0, and the inequality changes its sign if w(gD)   w(gR) < 0.










(tD   tR) + 
w(gD)   w(gR)
(6)
are the voter types that are indierent between the candidates. Higher types vote for the candidate
who oers more public goods, while lower types support the other candidate. More formally, if
gD > gR, then w(gD) > w(gR) and candidate R receives the votes of all liberal voters with   L and
of all conservative voters with   C. Candidate R’s winning probability is derived by integrating






If, instead, gD < gR then candidate R receives the support of all voters (;P) where  > 
p,
p = L;C, and the winning probability is 1   G(
L;
C). The situation is reversed for candidate D,
i.e. if gD > gR then D’s winning probability is 1   G(
L;




Finally, suppose that gD = gR. Then (3) simpliﬁes to v(p;D)   tD  v(p;R)   tR, i.e., the
equation is independent of . As a consequence, all voters with ideology p either vote for the same
candidate, or if v(p;D)   tD = v(p;R)   tR then they are indierent between candidates.
For the moment, focus on the case that the Democrat provides more public goods than the
Republican. Within each ideological group, the highest types then vote for the Democrat, while
the lowest types vote Republican. Because ideological partisans get an additional payo from the
election of their closer candidate, the cuto voter type among conservatives, C, is larger than the
cuto voter type among liberals, L. This follows directly from (5) and (6). Intuitively, the social
conservative who is indierent between the Democrat and the Republican candidate is so because
his preference for the Democrat’s economic platform just counterbalances his cultural preference
for the Republican; but a voter who prefers the Democrat’s economic platform is someone with a
preference for high public good provision (i.e., a voter with a relatively high ). By an analogous
argument, the culturally liberal cuto voter is economically quite conservative (i.e., a low -type).
13For a more formal analysis, we need the derivatives of 
L and 
C with respect to tD and tR,





(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR)   )aDw0(gD)





(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR) + )aDw0(gD)
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(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR) + )aRw0(gR)
(w(gD)   w(gR))2 ; (11)












@tR . If, for example,
@
C
@tD > 0, then the Democrat (who receives the support of all voters above the cutos) can move both




then the Democrat can gain votes by proposing higher taxes. In an optimum, raising taxes must
create a trade-o between losing some socially liberal but ﬁscally conservative voters and gaining
some social conservatives who prefer a higher consumption of public goods. Thus, in equilibrium,
@
C
@tD < 0 <
@
L
@tD. A similar argument shows that, in equilibrium,
@
L




In order to determine the equilibrium cuto, it is useful to investigate how the candidates’ tax
rates aect the cuto types in a L   C diagram. We ﬁrst deﬁne functions kD and kR that map the
respective candidate’s tax rate into a curve of the cuto points 
L and 
C, taking as given the tax
rate of the opponent (which we suppress in the notation). Thus, kD describes the feasible set of
cuto voter combinations that the Democratic candidate can implement for any tax rate between 0
and 1, and kR is the same curve for the Republican.
An important characteristic of these curves is their signed curvature. In general, the curvature












The absolute value of  at a particular point is the inverse of the radius of the circle that approxi-
mates the curve in this point; thus, a small value of  corresponds to an almost linear curve, while









Figure 1: The curves kR: tR 7! (
L;
C) and kD: tD 7! (
L;
C).
cuto point moves through the curve in a clockwise direction (and vice versa).11
The following Lemma 1 characterizes the curves kD and kR, drawn in Figure 1.
Lemma 1.
1. The function kR: [0;1] ! R2 deﬁned by tR 7! (
L(tR);


















C C C C A
 3=2
: (13)
2. The function kD: [0;1] ! R2 deﬁned by tD 7! (
L(tD);


















C C C C A
 3=2
: (14)
Lemma 1 implies that the signs of D and R equal the sign of the term in the denominator
(because w00 < 0, and all the other terms are positive). Thus, if w(gD) > w(gR), both curves rotate in
a counterclockwise direction, and vice versa if instead w(gD) < w(gR). Lemma A.1 in the Appendix
shows the shapes of kR and kD are those drawn in Figure 1.
In equilibrium each candidate chooses a tax rate that maximizes his probability of winning,
taking the opponent’s tax rate as given. In order to characterize the equilibrium and to determine
11For example, consider t 7! (rsin(t);rcos(t)). This is a circle with radius r, and has curvature  =  1=r. The neg-
ative sign indicates that as we raise t, the curve is drawn clockwise. In contrast, the curvature of t 7! (rcos(t);rsin(t))
is  = 1=r. The positive sign means that the rotation (as t increases) is counterclockwise.
15necessary conditions for its existence, it is useful to deﬁne isoprobability curves, comprising all
combinations of cuto voter types that lead to the same winning probability. Formally, an iso-
probability curve is a set of (L;C) that fulﬁll an equation of the form G(L;C) = ¯ k, where ¯ k is
a constant. Such isoprobability curves are depicted in Figure 2. Clearly, any isoprobability curve
must have a negative slope, as an increase in L must be oset by a decrease in C in order to keep















Figure 2: Necessary conditions for an equilibrium.
In the left panel of Figure 2, consider point (L;C), the cutos implied by some tax rates
(tD;tR). Is (tD;tR) an equilibrium? Note that candidate D, who can move along the convex curve
kD by changing tD, could increase his winning probability only if he gets to a point below the solid
isoprobability curve. However, this is impossible here because kD is tangent to the isoprobability
curve at (L;C). In contrast, kR is not tangent, so that candidate R can increase his winning proba-
bility by moving to any point above the solid isoprobability curve, for example to (ˆ L; ˆ C), which is,
in fact, his optimal deviation. As indicated in Figure 1, curve kR rotates in a counter-clockwise di-
rection as tR increases, so to reach (ˆ L; ˆ C) requires a decrease in tR. Since candidate R can improve
by deviating, (L;C) is not an equilibrium.
For (
L;
C) to be an equilibrium, we must have a situation as drawn in the right panel where
both kD and kR are tangent to the isoprobability curve at (
L;
C). Here, any “small” deviation
makes the deviating candidate worse o. By a small deviation, we mean one that does not change
the structure of voter support in the sense that, for both ideological groups, it is still the case
that low -types vote Republican and high -types vote Democrat (i.e., cuto types (ˆ L; ˆ C) remain
above the 45-degree line).
16Lemma 2 formally summarizes the necessary tangency condition for an equilibrium. Note that
this result does not depend on Assumption 1.
Lemma 2. Let (t
D;t
R) be an equilibrium with f(t
D) , f(t
R) and 0 < t
D;t
R < 1. Then
1. The curves kR and kD are tangent to each other at t
D, t








2. The isoprobability curve through (
L;













C) = 0: (16)
Condition (15) implies a general comparative static result. Since w00 < 0 it follows that w0 is
monotone, and consequently, any increase of tD must result in an increase of tR and vice versa.
Thus, there are no exogenous changes (e.g., to the isoprobability curves) that lead to an increase
in the equilibrium value of tR and, at the same time, to a decrease in tD; whenever a parameter
change aects equilibrium platforms, the change goes in the same direction. However, in contrast
to the classical median voter model, or the probabilistic voting model in which candidate platforms
move exactly in parallel, a parameter change may lead to more or less dierentiation in economic
platforms in our model, i.e., the policy dierence tD   tR may decrease or an increase. We will
return to this issue in more detail in Section 5.
We now turn to sucient conditions for existence of an equilibrium. In addition to a stan-
dard (global) Nash equilibrium, we also consider “local” equilibria. In a local equilibrium small
deviations from the equilibrium strategies cannot make a candidate strictly better o. There are
unmodeled, but plausible constraints that make the notion of local equilibrium particularly relevant
to our model of candidate competition. Formally, candidates in our model can commit to any tax
rate (as long as it is sucient to pay for the candidate-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of bureaucracy), and
voters believe that the candidate will carry out whatever he promises. However, in practice, some
promises may be more credible than others. Suppose, for example, that voters ex-ante “expect”
that the Democrat will announce a tax rate of 10 percent, and the Republican one of 8 percent. For
this conﬁguration to be a stable equilibrium, it appears highly desirable that deviating to any other
tax rate between, say 9 and 11 percent is not proﬁtable for the Democrat, and similarly that small
deviations from 8 percent are not proﬁtable for the Republican. In contrast, even if the Democrat
could in principle gain by deviating to, say, a tax rate of 5 percent (assuming the Republican stays
17at 8 percent), this may not be suciently credible to convince low  types (i.e., rich voters) to vote
for the Democrat. The notion of a local equilibrium captures this intuition that “big” deviations
from expected behavior may not be feasible for candidates.
We also consider the notion of a semi-global equilibrium. Consider a situation in which R
receives the support of all types below the cutos 
C and 
L, and D the support of everyone above.
A strategy proﬁle is a semi-global equilibrium if it is robust against all deviations that do not
change the qualitative structure of the candidates’ support, i.e., after the deviation, R still gets the
support of suciently low types, and D those of suciently high types. Since small deviations do
not change the qualitative structure of the candidates’ support, a semi-global equilibrium is also a
local equilibrium, but not necessarily the other way around.
Deﬁnition 1. 1. (t
R;t





D, respectively, such that (t
R;t
D) is a Nash equilibrium if the candidates’ strategies





D) is a semi-global equilibrium if and only if (t
R;t
D) is a Nash equilibrium when candi-
date strategies are restricted to the sets ftRjfR(tR) < fD(t
D)g and ftDjfD(tD) > fR(t
R)g, respec-
tively.
Consider again the right panel of Figure 2. The necessary conditions for an equilibrium are
satisﬁed at (
L;
C). It is also clear that at least any local deviation (in the sense of Deﬁnition 1
cannot increase the winning probability of a candidate: Any point on kR is below, and any point on
kD is above the isoprobability curve. The reason is that the curvatures of kR and kD exceed that of
the isoprobability curve.
The left panel of Figure 3 shows a situation in which the necessary conditions are satisﬁed
at (
L;
C), but where this is not a local equilibrium. The curvature of the isoprobability curve
at (
L;
C) is strictly positive and larger than than that of kD. Thus, candidate D can increase his
winning probability by increasing tD in order to move to a point below the isoprobability curve
such as (ˆ L; ˆ C). In the right panel, the curvature of the isoprobabilility curve is negative. Since
the curvature of kR at (
L;
C) is larger in absolute value, we have (at least) a local equilibrium.
Note that in this case there is no restriction on the curvature of kD. As a consequence, a necessary
condition for a local equilibrium is that the curvature G of the isoprobability curve at (
L;
C)
is strictly between  R(t
R) and D(t
D). Further, if this condition holds for all points along the


















Figure 3: Necessary and Sucient Conditions for an equilibrium.
formally states necessary and sucient conditions for an equilibrium.
Theorem 1.
1. Suppose that (t
D;t
R) is a local equilibrium with f(t
D) , f(t
R) and 0 < t
D;t
R < 1. Then
conditions (15) and (16) hold, and the curvature of the the isoprobability curve is between





2. Suppose that 0 < t
D;t
R < 1 satisfy (15) and (16) and that the curvature of isoprobability






D is a local
equilibrium.
3. Same as item 2, and, in addition, suppose that the curvature of the isoprobability curve
through (
L;
C) is strictly between  kR(t
R) and kD(t
D) for all points above the 45 degree line.
Then t
R, t
D is a semi-global equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix. 
195 Comparative Statics
5.1 Preliminaries
From Lemma 2, we know that in equilibrium kD and kR are tangent to each other. This property
is equivalent to (15). If w is strictly concave, w0 is strictly monotone and we can therefore solve
(15) by writing tD as a function of tR. The set of tangency points of kD and kR are given by
K(tR) = kD(tD(tR)). If Assumption 1 is satisﬁed, then tD(tR) > tR, and as a consequence curve K
is located above the 45-degree line. Curve K is useful for comparative statics, since it must be
tangent to an isoprobability curve in any equilibrium. Lemma 3 below analyzes its key properties.
Lemma 3. 1. Let tD(tR) be the solution of the equation (15). Then the curve of all tangency













2. DtRK(tR) = [1   t0
D(tR)]DtRkr(tR)
From Lemma 1, we know that R > 0 whenever C > L. Thus, the ﬁrst point of Lemma 3
implies that the signed curvature of K(tR), is strictly positive, and therefore K turns counter-
clockwise. The second point determines whether the curve is convex or concave toward the origin.
If t0
D(tR) < 1, the derivative of K must point in the same direction as the derivative of kR and thus, K
is concave toward the origin, just like kR. In contrast, if t0
D(tR) > 1, K is convex toward the origin.
Depending on whether t0
D(tR) is smaller or greater than 2, the curvature of K is larger or smaller
than that of kR.
What determines the sign of 1   t0
D(tR)? We provide some examples.
Example 1 If w(g) =  e sg then t0
D(tR)  aR=aD < 1.





















s . Since aR < aD, this implies that t0
D > 1 if s < 1 and t0
D < 1 if s > 1.
Note that for s = 1 we have log utility, in which case tD increases one-to-one in tR so that the
dierence tD   tR is constant at all points where kD and kR are tangent to each other. Furthermore,
20(17) implies that, for s = 1, K has an inﬁnite curvature so that the “curve” K is condensed into
a single point. That is, only one particular pair of cuto values 
L and 
C are consistent with
equilibrium. This holds independent of the distribution G. In particular, changes in the distribution
of preference types in the electorate (say, a higher percentage of liberals or a higher preference of
all voters for public good provision) generally aect equilibrium tax rates, but do this in a way that
the equilibrium cutos remain constant.
For the comparative static analysis, we focus on a class of voter type distributions with a known
ideological composition of the electorate, but uncertainty about the economic preference distribu-
tion. This appears quite realistic, because the relative constancy of the preference distribution in
important “value” issues is well documented (e.g., Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2006)). In contrast,
exact individual preferences on the trade-o between public good provision and taxation are much
harder to pinpoint in opinion polls (than, say, preferences over abortion), and economic preferences
are also more likely to change over time (say, with the current or expected position in the business
cycle).
Assumption 2.
1. The electorate consists of a fraction p of liberals, and 1   p of conservatives.
2. For each ideology type,  is normally distributed with mean    !, and standard deviation
.
Let ;() denote the cdf of a normal distribution with mean  and standard deviation , then
the distribution of voter types given ! is ;(   !). We now construct the isoprobability curves
G(L;R) by determining the collection of all L, R at which the election ends in a tie, for a given
¯ !, i.e.
p;(L   ¯ !) + (1   p);(C   ¯ !) = 0:5; (19)
Thus, if the cuto types (L;C) are on this curve, then the candidate who gets the support of
all low  types, wins in all states ! < ¯ !, loses when ! > ¯ !, and the election ends in a tie if ! = ¯ !.
Lemma 4 summarizes how the shape of the isoprobability curves depends on parameters.
Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds.
1. If p = 1=2, then all isoprobability curves are straight lines with curvature 0.
212. The curvature G of the isoprobability curves is continuous in p. Thus, for p close to 1=2, G
is close to 0.
3. If p < 0:5 (p > 0:5), then isoprobability curves are strictly concave (strictly convex) above
the 45 degree line, and strictly convex (strictly concave) below the 45 degree line.















C(L), is negative and decreases in p (i.e., becomes steeper), is constant in , and
decreases (increases) in  if p < 1=2 (p > 1=2). Moreover, lim!1 0
C =  p=(1   p).
Proof. See Appendix. 
These properties are the key to our comparative static results, so it is worthwhile discussing
a few of the results brieﬂy. If p = 1=2, then a tie requires that the Democrat wins exactly the
same percentage of liberals as the Republican wins of conservatives. Thus, isoprobability curves
are straight lines with slope  1. If, instead, p is small, then a tie between the candidates requires
that the candidates split conservatives more-or-less 50/50, so that C is close to the median of the
-distribution,  !. In contrast, L will be relatively far away from this maximum. Because there
is less probability mass in the tails than in the center of a normal distribution, a further decrease
of L is easier and easier to compensate with increases in C, which implies the concave shape
of the isoprobability curves above the 45-degree line. An analogous argument implies that the
isoprobability curves are convex below the 45-degree line, if p < 1=2. Obviously, these results just
ﬂip around if p > 1=2.
Finally, as  increases, the dierence between the probability mass in the center and in the
tails diminishes, and isoprobability curves become more like straight lines. Thus, for p < 1=2, as
 increases, isoprobability curves become steeper above the 45-degree line.
5.2 Ideological polarization
We can conceptualize “polarization” in two dierent ways. In the next section, we will deal with
changes of the economic preference distribution (both shifts and increasing the spread in the dis-
tribution of  for both ideological voter types. The latter captures economic polarization, i.e., an
22increase of the number of people who either want a very strong or a very limited government
spending. However, in this section, we start with the comparative static analysis of the eects
of ideological polarization. This includes both changes in the composition of the electorate from
social conservatives and social liberals, and in the intensity with which these groups care about the
ideological dierences between candidates.
Consider ﬁrst an increase of the proportion of social conservatives in the electorate (i.e., p de-
creases). Lemma 4 implies that the isoprobability curves become ﬂatter. In Figure 4, the original
equilibrium is the tangency point of K and the solid isoprobability curve. The new, ﬂatter, iso-
probability curves are indicated by the dashed lines, and the black circle marks the new tangency
point. In both cases (the left panel with t0
D(tR) < 1 and the right panel with t0
D(tR) > 1), the new
equilibrium moves in the direction of the rotation of the curves, i.e., both tR and tD increase.
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Figure 4: Comparative Statics: Increase of social conservatives ( p decreases)
The two cases of t0
D(tR) < 1 and t0
D(tR) > 1 dier in what they imply about the structure of voter
polarization.12 For t0
D(tR) < 1 (the left panel) 
L decreases, while 
C increases. Intuitively, while
both candidates increase taxes, the Democratic increase is smaller than the Republican one, and
thus, parties become more similar economically. As a consequence, the two ideology cutos move
away from the 45-degree line, and thus, society appears more polarized along cultural-ideological
issues (i.e., more socially-conservative types vote for the Republican, and more socially-liberal
12Which of these cases obtains is determined primarily by the shape of the preferences for public goods, w(g). As
shown above, if w corresponds to exponential utility or if w(g) = g1 s=(1   s), with s > 1 (i.e., more curvature than
logarithmic utility), then t0
D < 1.
23types vote for the Democrat). In contrast, if t0
D(tR) > 1 (right panel), then the parties’ economic
platforms become more dissimilar (as the Democrat increases taxes by more than the Republican),
and consequently, the Democrat now appeals to more socially-conservative voter types, and fewer
socially-liberal types.
An increase in the number of social conservatives (i.e., of voters with a cultural bias for the
small government party) leads both candidates to increase their proposed tax rate. This result may
appear surprising, but the logic behind it is quite straightforward. Remember that candidates com-
pete for the support of cuto voters, and that cuto voters are torn between their economic and
cultural-ideological preferences in that they like the economic position of one candidate and the
cultural position of the other. In particular, the socially-conservative cuto voter prefers a higher
level of government spending than is provided by both candidates, while the socially liberal cuto
voter prefers a smaller level of government spending. An increase in the number of social conser-
vatives makes it attractive for both candidates to put more weight on the economic preferences of
the conservative cuto voter, and thus to increase the provision of public goods.
Moreover, this eect is likely to be very robust, in the sense that it does not depend on the spe-
ciﬁc setup. In our model, the productivity dierence between candidates is what drives candidate
dierentiation. Alternatively, one could, for example, imagine a model in which the Republican
candidate has a more conservative ideal position on both the cultural and the economic dimension
than the Democrat, and both candidates are policy motivated and use their economic position to
maximize their expected utility from the implemented policy. Whether in this or any other model in
which candidates have at least some incentive to care about winning the election, they will consider
the desires of swing voters more than those of core supporters (i.e. voters who either vote for the
candidate or for his opponent, no matter what policies the candidates choose), and, to the extent
that there are dierent swing voter groups, their relative sizes inﬂuence which group candidates
cater to most. Socially conservative swing voters are necessarily economic liberals (otherwise,
they would be the core supporters of the Republican), and socially liberal swing voters are eco-
nomic conservatives. An increase in the number of a particular swing voter group means that the
candidates’ incentive to cater to this group (through their policy choice) is increased.
Our result appears consistent with behavior observed in the last decade in which Republicans
were in control of the executive and the legislative branch for most of the time. The aftermath
of the terrorist attacks of September 11 conceivably increased the proportion of voters with a
non-economic preference for the Republican party (and their intensity of preference), and the Re-
24publicans in spite of their small-government rhetoric, increased government spending as a fraction
of GDP from 18.2 percent in 2000 to 20.7 percent in 2008.
Since 2008, Republicans have become more concerned with the deﬁcit, but this is probably due
to intraparty eects that are not present in our model: In our model, candidates take positions that
maximize their winning probability in the general election, while taking as given the support of
theircoreconstituencies. Whilethiswaslikelyagooddescriptionuntil2008, itisquiteconceivable
that the rise of the “Tea Party” has shifted the focus of Republican politicians from choosing the
policy that would be most successful in the general election to choosing a policy that minimizes
the probability of being attacked from the right in a primary.
Next, we analyze how the equilibrium is aected by changes in  and , which can be inter-
preted as changes in the social policy partisanship of conservatives and liberals, respectively, an-
other measure of polarization. In general, the intuition for the eect of an intensiﬁcation of cultural
preferences is very transparent in our model framework: More intense non-economic preferences
among social conservatives, for example, imply that the conservative cuto type must increase
(i.e., has a stronger preference for government spending than before) in order to remain indier-
ent between Republican and Democrat. As candidates maximize some weighted average of the
economic preferences of socially liberal and socially conservative cuto voters, they now have
an incentive to propose higher government spending. For simplicity, we focus on the case where
isoprobability curves are straight lines (e.g., p = 0:5, or  suciently large).13
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Figure 5: Comparative Statics: Increase of  for linear isoprobability curves
13The extension to general isoprobability curves is available from the authors upon request.
25Figure 5 shows the eect of increasing . The solid curves represent the orginal K curves
(for t0
D < 1 in the left panel and for t0
D > 1 in the right panel). The dashed curves show K after 
increases. NotethattD(tR)isindependentof. Thus, (5)impliesthat
L decreases, while(6)implies
that C remains unchanged. Therefore points on the solid and dashed K lines that correspond to
the same tax rate tR are aligned horizontally. The curved arrow along K indicates the direction of
movement as tR increases.
Equations (31) and (32) in the Appendix imply that for given tR, the slope of K(tR) increases
(i.e., a negative slope becomes less steep) as  increases. The comparative static result for  now
follows immediately from simple geometric observations. In the left panel, the new equilibrium
point is below the horizontal line. Given the direction of rotation of K indicated by the arrow, this
corresponds to a lower tR and hence lower tD. The cuto C decreases. L may decrease (as in the
graph) or increase, depending on the curvature of K.
In the right panel, the new equilibrium is above the horizontal line. Again, the rotation direction
of K impliesthatatthisnewequilibrium, taxesarelower. Notethat C increases, whileL decreases
— in the case of t0
D > 1 there is no ambiguity about the change of cutos.
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Figure 6: Comparative Statics: Increase of for linear isoprobability curves
Figure 6 shows that, by analogous arguments, increasing  leads to the reverse eects of in-
creasing : Increasing  moves K up and results in a steeper slope along vertical lines; note that
vertical rather than horizontal lines connect points on the two K curves with the same tax rate; and
in equilibrium, taxes are increased rather than decreased.
Finally, note that the eect of a parameter change on the expected economic policy does not
26only depend on the eect that the parameter change has on equilibrium platforms, but also on who
wins the election. As Figures 5 and 6 indicate, the winning probability of candidate D increases as
 increases, and similarly, the winning probability of candidate R rises in response to an increase
of . Consider, for example the case where liberals become more partisan, so that both candidates
propose a lower tax rate. However, since the winning probability of candidate D increases, who
proposes a higher tax rate than candidate R, the net eect on the expected tax rate is ambiguous.
We now summarize our results.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that either t0
D(tR) < 1 for all tR or
t0
D(tR) > 1 for all tR, and that the isoprobability curves are straight lines. Then
1. Suppose that liberal ideology intensity  increases. Then both candidates decrease their
proposed tax rate. If t0
D < 1 then the cuto C decreases. If t0
D > 1, cuto C increases while
L decreases.
2. Suppose that conservative ideology intensity  increases. Then both candidates increase
their proposed tax rate. If t0
D < 1 then the cuto L decreases while C increases. If t0
D > 1,
cuto L increases.
3. If p decreases, then tD and tR increase and the winning probability of candidate D decreases.
If t0
D(tR) < 1 then 
L decreases and 




C the economic position is a perfect predictor of voting behavior. As 
L  
C increases,
ideology starts becoming a better predictor, until economics becomes irrelevant and only ideology
matters (when 
L = 1 and 
C =  1). One may expect that increasing  or  would make ideology
a better predictor of voting behavior. However, our results shows that this is not necessarily true.
For example, when  increases and t0
D < 1 the new equilibrium may be closer to the 45 degree line
(as indicated in Figure 6), i.e., 
C   
L decreases and economics becomes more important. The
reason is that as taxes are increased, t0
D < 1 implies that the dierence between the tax rates, tD tR
increases. Hence, the economic dierence between the platforms increases which counterbalances
the eect of the increased ideological dierences between the candidates.
It is easy to extend the results of Theorem 2 to nonlinear isoprobability curves. Depending
on whether the isoprobability curves are convex or concave above the 45 degree line, the eects
described in the theorem are strengthened or weakened.
27As a ﬁnal comparative static exercise, consider a simultaneous increase of the ideological in-
tensity for both liberals and conservatives (i.e., both  and  increase by the same amount, h). This
is particularly useful if we want to think about ideology in a spatial framework: Suppose that voter
preferences are constant, but that candidate positions on the ideological dimension move away




























Figure 7: Comparative Statics: Both and  are increased by the same amount h.
Figure 7 considers a case with p < 1   p, i.e., there are more conservatives than liberals, and
linear isoprobability curves. Equations (5) and (6) show that if taxes remain the same, then the
new cuto value moves exactly to the northwest, along a line with slope  1 to the point indicated
by the white circle. We refer to this change as the ideology eect.
At the original equilibrium cutos, the slope of K is  p=(1   p) because K is tangent to the
isoprobability curve through (L;C). Equations (31) and (32) imply that after the increase of  and
 by amount h, the derivative of K in the L direction, which is negative, becomes more negative
by some amount h0. The derivative in the C direction, which is positive, increases by the same
amount h0. Thus, p < 1   p implies that the slope must become steeper.14 The change of the slope
of K implies that taxes must change, since we do not have tangency at the white circle. We refer
to the change in cutos because of the tax change as the tax eect.
Speciﬁcally, consider the left panel of Figure 7, where t0
D < 1. The concavity of K implies that
14Note that if p = 1   p then the slope of K would not change, and we would have tangency at the point indicated
by the white circle, i.e., taxes would stay the same.
28the tax eect moves the new tangency point even further to the northwest. Since we move in the
direction of the arrow (counterclockwise), taxes increase. Since t0
D < 1, the dierence between the
candidates’ tax rates decreases. Thus, candidates dier less on economic policy, and consequently,
voters separate more by ideology: The tax eect and the ideology eect reinforce each other.
The right panel of Figure 7 analyzes the case of t0
D > 1. Again, if tax rates were kept constant,
the cuto moves to the northwest. However, from there, the convexity of K implies that the new
tangency point moves toward the southeast, again in the direction of increased taxes. For t0
D > 1,
the tax eect and the ideology eect have opposite signs. Hence, it is possible that the dierence
between cutos 
C   
L remains almost unchanged, and thus, there is no perceived increase in
the extent to which ideology rather than economic interests determine voting behavior, even after
ideological polarization has increased. The reason is that when t0
D > 1 and taxes increase, the dif-
ference in tax rates increases, so that candidates’ economic policies dier more. Hence, economic
policy becomes more important for voters, too, which can countervail the increased importance of
ideology.
The eects are reversed if p > 1   p. In this case, proposed tax rates always decrease as
the ideological intensity of the electorate increases. The ideology eect and the tax eect go in
opposite direction when t0
D < 1, and they reinforce each other when t0
D > 1.
5.3 Economic polarization
We now consider changes in the distribution of economic preferences. Note that changes in eco-
nomic preferences leave the location of the curve K unaected, while generally changing the loca-
tion of isoprobability curves.
Consider ﬁrst what happens when the mean  of the distribution changes. For a given point
(L;C), (19) remains satisﬁed if ¯ ! adjusts in a way that exactly osets the change in . As a
consequence, the shape of isoprobability curves remains the same, but each of them corresponds
to a lower realization of !. Thus, the equilibrium does not change since the K curve remains
tangent to an isoprobability curve. However, the isoprobability curve that is tangent to K now
corresponds to a higher probability of winning for candidate D.
Thisresultimpliesthatthecandidates’economicpolicyproposalsdisplayaremarkablerigidity.
Remember that an increase in  means that, for any given level of !, all voters would like to have
more public goods than before. Yet, this change has no eect on equilibrium policies, but instead
29changesthe candidates’winning probabilities. Tounderstand thisresult, note ﬁrstthat ina standard
spatial setup, both candidates can appeal equally to all voters. For this reason, both candidates cater
to the median voter, the voter type who is decisive for the outcome of the election (or the expected
median voter, if there is uncertainty about the distribution of voter types). This implies that, if the
median voter’s preferences change, the candidates’ positions exactly reﬂect this change and adapt
to the median’s new preferred position.
Incontrast, candidatesinourmodelhaveexogenousadvantagesanddisadvantagesinappealing
to particular voter types. Cuto types are determined as those voter types to whom candidates can
appeal equally. Remember that, in equilibrium, both candidates choose positions that appeal to
some type located between the liberal and the conservative cuto voter. Thus, in principle, each
candidate could expand his set of liberal supporters relative to the equilibrium, but only at the
expense of his conservative support. This trade-o is the same for both candidates, and it does not
change as the likely preference distribution changes. Speciﬁcally, an increase in  by  increases
the expected average value of  in the population and thus, for a given value of !, increases the
vote share of the Democrat. Thus, the critical state of the world in which the candidates receive
a vote share of exactly one-half decreases by , and consequently, candidates face exactly the
same preference distribution in the critical state. Thus, both candidates continue to maximize their
respective voter support with unchanged platforms.
Now consider an increase in , the standard deviation of the distribution of . Since  = =m,
where  is the preference for public good provision and m the individual’s income, an increase in
 can be caused by an increase in income inequality or an increase in polarization of .
If there are as many liberals as conservatives (p = 0:5), then Lemma 4 implies that equilibrium
platforms and winning probabilities do not change. If there are more conservatives than liberals
(i.e., p < 0:5), then Lemma 4 implies that increasing  results in steeper isoprobability curves
above the 45-degree line. Qualitatively, the results correspond to those we derived for increasing
p (the fraction of liberals), i.e., the equilibrium tax rates of both candidates decrease. Similarly, if
p > 0:5, then increasing  results in a ﬂatter isoprobability curves and all eects are reversed.
This result establishes a relation between economic polarization and equilibrium economic
platforms. For example, suppose that the income distribution becomes more unequal, which results
in a larger standard deviation of . Consider the case where p < 1=2, which appears plausible in the
U.S. where self-described conservatives usually outnumber self-described liberals by a substantial
margin. Then, an increase in economic polarization (i.e., ) increases the equilibrium spending by
30both candidates. Moreover, if t0
D(tR) < 1 (which happens with exponential utility, or with a utility
function for which the marginal utility of public good consumption decreases suciently fast),
then economic polarization of voters leads to convergence of the tax rates proposed by the two
parties. As a consequence of this increased economic similarity between parties, citizens’ votes
will reﬂect more strongly their cultural cultural preferences. That is, 
L decreases and 
C increases
so that more liberal voter types vote for the Democrat, and more social conservatives vote for the
Republican.
To highlight the signiﬁcant dierences between our dierentiated candidates model and previ-
ous literature, it is instructive to compare our result with the seminal model of Meltzer and Richard
(1981), where economic polarization is interpreted as an increase in the dierence between the in-
come of the median voter and the average income in the economy. In their model, polarization thus
means that the median voter beneﬁts more from redistribution (so their eect goes in the opposite
direction from ours if p < 1=2).15 It is well known that empirical tests of this prediction tend to
ﬁnd the opposite eect, which is a signiﬁcant puzzle. For example, Lindert (1996) uses panel data
from 19 OECD countries for the time period 1960-1992 and analyzes what factors inﬂuence social
and other government spending. He ﬁnds that an increase in his measure of income inequality (the
ratio between the average income of the top and the bottom quintile of the income distribution)
signiﬁcantly decreases total government expenditures.
The eect of the income distribution in Meltzer and Richard (1981) is driven by the gap be-
tween median and average income. If this gap increases, the median voter beneﬁts more from
redistribution (either directly, or through an increased provision of public goods). With a sym-
metric distribution, a change in the standard deviation  would not aect policy in Meltzer and
Richard (1981).
We consider symmetric distributions of  (remember that  = =m so that, even if the income
distribution is skewed to the right, as is always the case for empirical income distributions, the
distribution of  may be symmetric or skewed either to the left or to the right). The intuition for
our result is that, if economic preferences become more polarized, voters eectively care more
about economic issues and thus, in comparison, relatively less about ideology; to see this, note that
15In the economic growth literature, the seminal papers of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini
(1994) show that, empirically, pre-tax inequality is bad for economic growth. Their theoretical models explain this
by a close variation on the Meltzer and Richard (1981) model: More unequal societies have higher taxes which has a
negative eect on savings and thus growth. However, neither paper tests whether pre-tax inequality actually increases
government spending.
31an increase of  means that more voters have types such that they vote Democrat or Republican
independently of their ideological disposition. As we know from the previous section, a decrease in
the ideological preference intensity of voters is bad news for the party whose ideology is supported
by a majority of voters (in terms of their probability of winning). The policy eect is similar to the
one that would result if the majority ideological types start to care less about ideology. If p < 1=2,
this means that policy reacts in the same way that it would if conservatives became less ideological,
and consequently, equilibrium tax rates decrease.
Theorem 3 formally summarizes our results in this section.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that either t0
D(tR) < 1 for all tR or
t0
D(tR) > 1 for all tR.
1. If  increases, then the equilibrium policies are unaected, but the winning probability of
candidate D increases.
2. An increase of  has the following eects.
(a) If p < 0:5, then equilibrium tax rates tD and tR decrease. If t0
D(tR) < 1, then cuto 
L
increases while 
C decreases, and the reverse is true for t0
D(tR) > 1.
(b) If p = 0:5, then equilibrium policies, cutos 
L, 
C and winning probabilities are unaf-
fected.
(c) If p > 0:5, then equilibrium tax rates tD and tR increase. If t0
D(tR) < 1, then 
L decreases
while 
C increases, and the reverse is true for t0
D(tR) > 1.
The prediction of our model that government spending decreases in countries with a majority of
social conservatives as a consequence of an increase in inequality is compatible with the empirical
result of Lindert (1996) discussed above. Moreover, it is interesting that such an eect may be
reinforcing in a dynamic version of the model: In a country with more social conservatives (such
as the US), an initial increase in inequality decreases government spending. If , say, education
expenditures are reduced, this policy response may conceivably increase pre-tax income inequality
in the future even further, which leads to more cuts in government spending and so on. In contrast,
in a society with a majority of social liberals, an initial increase in inequality increases government
spending, which is likely to decrease future inequality.
326 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model in which voters care about both social ideology (which,
in our model, is exogenously given for candidates) and the economic positions that candidates take.
The interaction between these two dimensions is of ﬁrst-order importance for our understanding of
what determines economic policy: In reality, there are considerable dierences in candidates’ eco-
nomic policy platforms, but voter preferences for parties and candidates appear to be inﬂuenced by
both economic and, probably to an even greater extent, by cultural-ideological positions. A model
that explicitly incorporates these non-economic factors provides us with a better understanding of
this important interaction, and thus with a better understanding of the determinants of economic
policy than a model that abstracts from cultural ideology in order to focus entirely on economic
policy issues.
There is an intense and ongoing discussion in both political science and popular discourse as
to whether cultural or economic factors become more important as determinants of voter behavior
(Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002), Frank (2004), McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006)).
Our paper contributes to this literature by providing a uniﬁed model framework in which voters
care about both cultural-ideological positions and economic policy. Our main results are as fol-
lows: When choosing their economic platforms, candidates focus on the two swing voter groups
who are close to indierent between the two parties: Small-government/social liberals and big-
government/social conservatives. The equilibrium is determined in a way that a marginal increase
in taxes yields a candidate a larger set of supporters among social conservatives (because the cuto
type among social conservatives prefers more government spending) and a smaller set of support-
ers among social liberals. This result holds even if social conservatives are on average for a lower
level of taxation than social liberals, because candidates focus their attention on the respective
swing voters only.
Any change in equilibrium platforms that is brought about by changes in the voter preference
distribution goes in the same direction for both candidates: Either, both candidates propose higher
spending, or both propose lower spending than before. Furthermore, an increase in support for
the cultural-ideological position of the small-government party (either through an increase in the
number of social conservatives, or through an intensiﬁcation of their cultural preference) leads to
an increase in spending. The same holds when both groups become more ideologically polarized,
but there are more social conservatives than social liberals. Economic polarization may also aect
33equilibrium policies: If there are more conservatives than liberals, increasing economic preference
polarization (brought about, for example, by an increase in economic inequality) leads to lower
taxes – a result in sharp contrast with the result of the seminal work of Meltzer and Richard (1981).
347 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. For ﬁxed tD, consider the curve given by tR 7! (
L(tR);




@tR . Thus, (10) and (11) imply that
S(tR) =
(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR) + )aRw0(gR)
(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR)   )aRw0(gR)
: (21)
Let





= ( + )
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(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR)   )aRw0(gR)
2; (26)











































As a consequence (23), (24), (25) and (28) imply (13).
Similarly, it follows that the curvature of tD 7! (L(tD);C(tD)) is given by (14). 
35Lemma A.1 Suppose that  +  > 0. Then




























@tR must have opposing signs. Thus,
@
C
@tR > 0 while
@
L
@tR < 0. The tangent vector therefore
points toward the northwest.
Consider ﬁrst the kR-curve above the 45 degree line (i.e., 
C > 
L). (5) and (6) imply that
w(gD) > w(gR), so that D provides more public good than R. Thus, low  types vote for R and
high  types vote for D. Lemma 1 implies that R > 0, so that the curve rotates counterclockwise.
Since the tangent vector for negative slopes points northwest, it follows that the curve is concave.
Analogous arguments show that kR is convex below the 45-degree line, and that kD is convex
(concave) above (below) the 45-degree line, as shown in Figure 1. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Applying (10) and (11) it follows that the slope of (
L(tR);
C(tR)) is
(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR)   )aRw0(gR)
(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR) + )aRw0(gR)
: (29)
Similarly, (8) and (9) it follows that the slope of (
L(tD);
C(tD)) is
(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR)   )aDw0(gD)
(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR) + )aDw0(gD)
: (30)
Thus, (29) and (30) are the same if and only if aDw0(gD) = aRw0(gR). This proves the ﬁrst statement.
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(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR) + )aRw0(gR)







This and equations (10), and (11) proves the third statement of the Lemma.
Next, note that (31), (32) and (15) imply that the slope H(tR) = S(tR), where S(tR) is given by
(21). Thus, the candidates’ reaction functions have the same slope as (L(tR);C(tD(tR)).
Let
B(tR) = (w(fD(tD(tR)))   w(f(R(tR))))   (tD   tR)aRw
0(fR(tR)) (33)
Then (21) implies that
@B(tR)
@tR
















(w(gD)   w(gR))   ((tD   tR)   )aRw0(gR)
2; (35)











































Proof of Lemma 2. If fR(t
R)) < fD(t
D) then in equilibrium t
R must solve maxtR G(kR(tR)), while t
D











R mustsolvemintR G(kR(tR)), whilet
D solvesmaxtD G(kD(tD)).
The ﬁrst order conditions is therefore DtRkR(t
R)  rG(
L;
C) = 0. 





L. As a consequence, Lemma 1 implies that R;D > 0.
37The equation of the isoprobability curve is (L;C(L)), where, C(L) solves G(L;C(L)) =
G(
L;


















































The isoprobability curve at (
L;
C) is concave toward the origin if G < 0, and convex if G > 0.
Thus, ifG < 0anecessaryconditionisthatR   G. If, instead, G > 0theninalocalequilibrium
the curvature D cannot be strictly less than G, i.e., D  G.
The argument is similar if fD(t
D) < fR(t
R). In this case we must take into account that the
curvatures R and D are negative. As a consequence, we get jRj   G and jDj  G.
To prove the reverse implication, note that if (15) and (16) hold then Lemma 2 implies that
curves kR and kD are tangent at t
D and t
R to the isoprobability curves. If jRj >  G and jDj > G
then above argument implies that locally the curvature of the isprobability curve is strictly less than
of kD and kR. As a consequence, we have a local equilibrium.
The ﬁnal statement of the Theorem requires the curvature condition to hold for all points above
the 45 degree line if fD(t
D) > fR(t
R), or for all points below the 45 degree axis, otherwise. Thus, kR
and kD only touch the isoprobability curve at (
L;
C) and we have a semi-global equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 4. 1. Ifp = 1=2 and the density function f is symmetric around some point ¯ ,
then, for a tie to occur in state¯ ¯!, L  ¯ ¯! and C  ¯ ¯! must be located symmetrically around ¯ ,
i.e., the isoprobability curve associated with ¯ ! are straight lines of the form (¯  h+¯ ¯!; ¯ +h+
¯ ¯!), h 2 R, with curvature G  0. Thus, if p = 1=2, any solution to the necessary conditions
of Lemma 2 is a local equilibrium and a semi-global equilibrium. Note that this result is
independent of the distribution of -types, F.


















     ¯ !

: (38)
If p = 0:5, then(19)implies
L+C
2 = +¯ !, andhenceG = 0, resultinginlinearisoprobability
curves. If p is close to 0.5 then
L+C
2    + ¯ ! does not dier too much from zero, and hence
the curvature G remains close to zero.
38On the 45-degree line (L = C), (19) implies that L = C = + ¯ !. As a consequence, G = 0
for any p. Now suppose that p > 0:5. For candidates to tie in this case, the Republican needs
to attract the support of more conservatives than the Democrat attracts liberals. Since the
density f is symmetric, this requirement implies that  (L    ¯ !) < C    ¯ ! for L < C,
and the reverse inequality holds for L > C. As a consequence
L+C
2 >  + ¯ ! and hence
G < 0 for L < C, and G > 0 for L > C. Thus, isoprobability curves are convex above the
45 degree line, and concave below the 45 degree line. It follows immediately that this result
is reversed for p < 0:5, i.e., isoprobability curves are concave above the 45 degree line and
convex below.
Next, note that increasing  will move the curvature closer to zero. In particular, as  ! 1
all exponentials in (38) converge to 1, and hence G ! 0, i.e., isoprobability curves become













which is equivalent to (20). Note that (20) converges to  p=(1   p) as  ! 1.
Let L < C. Then (19) implies that (L + C)=2 <  + ¯ ! if p < 0:5. Thus, the argument of
the exponential function in (20) is strictly negative. Increasing  therefore decreases 0
C(L),
i.e., the slope becomes steeper. The reverse is true if p > 0:5.
Now suppose that the percentage of liberals, p, increases, and consider the isoprobability
curve through (L;C). Equation (19) implies that ¯ ! must decrease. Thus, the argument of
the exponential function in (20) increases. This and the increase of p implies that 0
C(L)
decreases, i.e., the slope of the isoprobability curve through (L;C) becomes steeper.
Finally, consider a change in . In order for (19) to hold after a change of , ¯ ! +  must
remain constant. Thus, a change in  does not aect 0
C(L).
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Figure 8: Existence of a global Equilibrium.
We now provide conditions for the existence of global equilibria. By Assumption 1, candi-
date D has higher ﬁxed costs but lower marginal costs. Consider tax rates t
R, t
D that satisfy the
ﬁrst-order condition, and for which D provides more of the public good. Then the associated
(
L;
C) is above the 45 degree axis. If the equilibrium is semi-global, then any deviation that
remains above the 45 degree line cannot increase a candidate’s probability of winning the election.
Thus, consider deviations to points below the 45-degree line. If the deviation is by candidate D,
then it involves a tax rate at which he provides strictly less of the public good than candidate R. In
therightpanelofFigure8, theoptimalsuchdeviationimplements(00
L;00
C)—notethat, forgD < gR,
the kD-curve becomes convex and D is supported by all voters below the cuto (00
L;00
C). Thus, he
maximizes his winning probability by moving to the highest possible isoprobability curve.
Deﬁne ¯ C to be the highest possible cuto among conservatives that R can achieve as long as
he provides less of the public good than D. Similarly, let ¯ L be the lowest possible cuto among
liberals that D can achieve as long as he provides more of the public good than R (see the right
panel of Figure 8). Formally,











Theorem 4 below show that (00
L;00
C) < (¯ L; ¯ C). Candidate D’s winning probability in the
original equilibrium is 1   G(
L;
C), since he receives the support of all voters above 
L, and

C, respectively. After the deviation, he receives the support of all voters below 
L, and C,
and his winning probability is G(00
L;00





C). Thus, if G(
L;
C) = 1=2, then it is guaranteed that D’s winning probability
when deviating, G(00
L;00
C) is lower than D’s equilibrium winning probability 1   G(
L;
C) = 1=2.
40An analogous argument shows that deviations by candidate R are not proﬁtable if G(
L;
C) is
suciently close to 1=2.
For the formal statement of this result in Theorem 4, we need to guarantee that the branches of
kR and kD above the 45 degree line resemble those in Figure 8, that is, cutos ¯ C and ¯ L exists. The
following assumption is sucient for this.
Assumption 3. Let ˆ tR be deﬁned by fR(ˆ tR) = fD(t
D), and ˆ tD by fR(t
R) = fD(ˆ tD). Then ˆ tR > t
D + 
and ˆ tD > t
R + .
Note that ˆ tR > t
D is the tax rate that the Republican would have to charge in order to provide the
same amount of public goods as the Democrat does in equilibrium, so that candidates dier only
in tax rate and ideology. Thus, all voters of the same ideology (irrespective of their ) have the
same preference over candidates. To avoid corner solutions and indeterminateness of equilibrium
tax rates, Assumption 3 requires that deviating to ˆ tR is unattractive for the Republican (he would
even lose all conservatives). The analogous condition for the Democratic candidate is ˆ tD > t
R + .
Clearly, Assumption 3 restricts the size of  and , because if ideology overwhelms all economic
considerations, then all conservatives vote for candidate R and all liberals for candidate D. Further,
note that  and  can be larger if the dierence between fD and fR increases, because this raises
both ˆ tR and ˆ tD.
Theorem 4. Let (t
R;t
D) be a semi-global equilibrium with fR(t
R) < fD(t
D), and suppose that
Assumption 3 is satisﬁed. Then
1. ¯ C and ¯ D deﬁned in (39) exists and (¯ C; ¯ C) > (
L;
C) > (¯ L; ¯ L).
2. If 1  G(¯ L; ¯ L) > G(
L;
C) > 1  G(¯ C; ¯ C). then (t
D;t
R) is a (global) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Note gD = gR if candidates at t
D and ˆ tR. Let t0
R < ˆ tR such that t0
R > t




R) < 0. Further, 
C(t
D;0) > 0. This. continuity and compactness imply that








Next, note that ¯ C > 
C. Clearly, ¯ C  
C . Thus, suppose that ¯ C = 











R) < 0. However, since @G
@tL(
L;
C) , 0, this implies
that statement 2 of Lemma 2 is violated. Thus, ¯ C > 
C.
Equations 5 and 6 imply (¯ C; ¯ C) > (
L;
C). Since the equilibrium is local, any deviation
˜ tR by candidate R with fR(˜ tR)  fD(t
D) cannot be optimal. Thus, consider a deviation ˜ tR with
fR(˜ tR) > fD(t
D). Let ˜ C, ˜ L be the new cuto voters. Now candidate R receives the support of all
types C  ˜ C and L  ˜ L, where ˜ C < ˜ L. We now show that ¯ C < ˜ C.
41Suppose by way of contradiction that ¯ C  ˜ C. Let ¯ tR 2 argmax0tR<ˆ tR 
C(t
D;tR). Then
¯ tR 2 argmax
tR<ˆ tR
m(1   tR) + ¯ Cw(fR(tR)) + : (41)
Else, if (41) is violated then there exists t0
R that gives type ¯ R a strictly higher utility. This, however,
means that ¯ R strictly prefers candidate R to candidate D if candidates choose t
D and t0
R, respec-
tively. Thus, by continuity there would exist 0
R > R such that 0
R strictly prefers R to D. This,
however, contradicts 40. Hence, (41) must hold.
Next, note that m(1 tR)+ ¯ Cw(fR(tR))+ is strictly concave in tR. Thus, ¯ t in (41) is the unique
maximum, even if we eliminate the constraint that tR < ˆ tR.
If ¯ C  ˜ C thentype ¯ C isatleastaswellfromcandidate Rwithtaxrate ˜ tR thanfromcandidateC
with tax rate t
D. This, however, means that ¯ C’s utility is at least as high from candidate R with tax
rate ¯ tR. This, however, contradicts that ¯ tR is the unique solution to (41). Thus, ¯ C < ˜ C. Hence,
the winning probability from deviating is 1  G(˜ L; ˜ C)  1  G(¯ C; ¯ C). Thus, the assumption that
G(
L;
C) > 1  G(¯ C; ¯ C) implies that such a deviation is not optimal.
Next, we consider deviations by candidate D. Since ˆ tD > t
R + , equation (5) implies that
limtD#ˆ tD 
L(tD;t
R) = 1. Thus, we can conclude that








The remainder of the argument is similar to that for ¯ C. In particular, it follows that ¯ L < 
L,
and that consequently (
L;
C) > (¯ L; ¯ L). Similar to above it follows that the utility of type ¯ L is
maximized when candidate D chooses tax rate ¯ tD that solves (42). As a consequence, concavity of
utility implies that any deviation t0
D 2 [0;1] makes type ¯ L worse o. It also follows again that, if
t0
D > ˆ tD then the new cuto voter ˜ L < ˆ L. Candidate D’s winning probability after the deviation
is G(˜ L; ˜ C) < G(ˆ L; ˜ C) < G(ˆ L; ˆ L), where the last inequality follows since ˜ C < ˜ L for tD > t0
D.
Thus, a sucient condition for the deviation not to be optimal is 1   G(
L;
C) > G(ˆ L; ˆ L), which
is equivalent to the condition 1  G(¯ L; ¯ L) > G(
L;
C) in the statement of the theorem. 
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